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Abstract 
Intergovernmental grants design is an important issue in developing countries, where the 
decentralization process involves a huge vertical gap, i.e. an imbalance between the costs of local 
public competences and local governments’ revenue raising powers. Our analysis considers the 
(dis)incentive effect of simple unconditional central grants on local own-source revenue. We highlight 
a theoretical ambiguity over the nature of this effect in assuming less efficiency of local governments 
in collecting taxes than of the central one. Our empirical analysis focuses on Benin. We study the 
impact of a very simple grant that has the properties of being collected at the borders by customs and 
being allocated among local governments through a fixed rule (the population of jurisdictions). Our 
empirical analysis covers panel data of 74 local governments from 2003 to 2008, and addresses 
potential endogeneity issues of central transfer. We conclude unambiguously with a positive impact of 
this grant on local own-source revenue. This effect is contingent on a minimum level of wealth of the 
jurisdiction, and is stronger for local governments that do not share the same political affiliation as the 
president in office. Our result emphasizes a neglected quality of unconditional transfers whose 
allocation rule is only based on the population of jurisdictions: their complementarity with local own-
source revenue. Such transfers are not only simpler than other formula-based equalization transfers, 
but they may also have an incentive effect on local own-source revenue. 
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1 Introduction
Since the middle of the 1980s, most African countries have started a decentralization process
by transferring some power, resources, and responsibilities to their local governments. The
expected gains are an increase in the responsiveness of policy to citizenspreferences, a bet-
ter accountability of decision-makers, and ultimately the reduction of poverty. However, an
imbalance often exists between the revenue-raising ability of local governments and their
expenditure responsibilities. This vertical scal gap is particularly important in developing
countries, since local governmentstaxing powers often remain inadequate to provide su¢ -
cient nancial support for the provision of basic services such as education and public health.1
In this context, central grants are essential to the success or failure of decentralization in
these countries.
However, intergovernmental scal transfers modify local government behaviors and their
design matters as much as their total amount (Bahl, 2000; Bird and Smart, 2002). Several
e¤ects have already been highlighted in the literature. Among the most documented, the
ypaper e¤ect is an empirical regularity: any increase in transfers leads to greater local
public spending than an equivalent rise in the private revenue of the local population (Hines
and Thaler, 1995). In a context of informational asymmetries, central grants challenge the
scal discipline of local governments by raising a moral hazard problem (Pisauro, 2001;
Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003).2 Central grants are perceived as a kind of windfall
resource, which crowd out local own-source revenue by reducing the willingness of local
governments to improve their tax e¤ort.3 More broadly, transfer dependency seems to erode
the accountability of local o¢ cials, a prerequisite of a successful decentralization process.
Given the vertical scal gap on the one hand and the incentive e¤ects of central grants on
the other, an important literature has been devoted to designing the structure of transfers
1 About 60 percent of local public spending is nanced through intergovernmental scal transfers in
developing countries (Shah, 1990).
2 Another e¤ect of central transfers is linked to the issue of soft budget constraint, and the risk of excessive
borrowing by subnational governments.
3 See Shah (1990) for Brazilian municipalities, Panda (2009) for Indian states, and Mogues, Benin, and
Cudjoe (2009) for districts of Ghana.
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in developed and developing countries (Boadway and Shah, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and
Searle, 2007). E¢ ciency and equity concerns at the national level should determine the
form of transfers. Following the literature, we consider two main categories of transfers:
general (unconditional) purpose grants and selective (conditional) matching grants, the latter
requiring that funds should be spent for specic purposes. In practice, grants mechanisms
vary signicantly among countries and combine matching and non-matching transfers.
A common view is that unconditional grants provide poor incentives for local govern-
ments to raise their own-source revenue and then to be accountable to their constituency.
To mitigate this trend, some countries include a tax e¤ort provision among economic and
welfare variables in the formula which determines the allocation of transfers among their lo-
cal governments. A growing literature has focused on the tax-raising e¤ects of these systems
in rich federations such as Australia, Canada, Germany, the USA and Switzerland (Smart,
2007; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2010). Some emerging countries, e.g. Brazil, India
and Nigeria, have also introduced performance criteria such as scal e¤ort in their distribu-
tive formulas for central grants (see Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005, for an international
comparison of formula-based allocation mechanisms). However, the lack of relevant data at
the local level, especially regarding local scal capacity or performance, limits the use of such
sophisticated transfer systems in many developing countries. Moreover, the complexity of
formulas increases the risk of political capture of the grantsallocation mechanisms as has
been recently emphasized in Ghana by Banful (2011) and in Senegal by Caldeira (2012).
We study the relationship between local own-source revenue and an unconditional grant,
whose allocation formula is very basic, relying only on the population of jurisdictions. Assum-
ing that local governments are less e¢ cient at collecting taxes than the central one, we rst
highlight a theoretical ambiguity over the (dis)incentive e¤ect of unconditional central grants
on local own-source revenue. Neither the normality of the local public good, nor the com-
plementarity/substitutability between public and private spending are su¢ cient conditions
to determine the e¤ect of grants on local own-source revenue in our very stylized analysis.
The unconditional grants studied raise own-source revenue if the latter induces a su¢ cient
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improvement in local public spending, or in other terms if the marginal utility of local public
good increases in local own-source revenue.
Our empirical analysis focuses on Benin, which shares several common features with
other sub-Saharan French-speaking countries such as a common history of the state, its
organization, its administration, and a recent top-down decentralization process. We examine
a specic unconditional grant, which is collected at the borders by customs and allocated
among jurisdictions, depending only on their population size. This grant represents around
55 percent of total transfers received by local governments. Based on panel data covering 74
local governments4 from 2003 to 2008, we conclude that there is a positive impact of this
unconditional transfer on local own-source revenue. The positive e¤ect is contingent on a
minimum level of local governments wealth, allowing them to mobilize more resources. It is
also stronger for jurisdictions that do not share the same political a¢ liation as the president
in o¢ ce: receiving fewer transfers from the central government, they seem to be more prone
to collect resources by themselves.
Our result highlights an ignored quality of unconditional transfers based on the population
of jurisdictions: their complementarity with own-source revenue. Simpler to implement than
other formula-based grants, the transfer studied improves local government autonomy in
Benin, not only on the expenditure side since it is not tied to any specic spending like
conditional grants, but also on the revenue side through its incentive e¤ect on local own-
source revenue.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief theoretical
discussion of the relationship between central grants and local own-source revenue; Section 3
describes the decentralization process in Benin and presents our empirical ndings; Section
4 Benin has 77 local governments. We exclude the three main urban jurisdictions (Cotonou, Porto-Novo,
and Parakou), which have a special status in the Beninese intergovernmental grants system.
5 Our conclusion also conrms the fourth lesson for transfer design given by Bird and Smart (2002):
"... if the general purpose grant is properly designed, and if local governments have some
discretion in tax policy, there is no need to include specic incentive features to encourage
additional tax e¤ort."
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4 concludes.
2 A simple theoretical framework
We adopt a very stylized optimal tax theory approach. Despite its simplicity, our formaliza-
tion allows us to establish a counterintuitive result, which has not been emphasized su¢ -
ciently in the literature on decentralization, especially with regard to developing countries:
unconditional grants6 may increase local own-source revenue.
We consider an economy with a composite private good (X) and a locally-provided pub-
lic good (Y ).7 A representative local government maximizes the utility of its representative
consumer. There are two sources of public revenue: local own-source revenue, denoted by
TL, resulting essentially from taxing the local population, and an unconditional intergovern-
mental grant (tr). The local governments budget constraint is then: TL + tr > Y .
We assume that local authorities are less e¢ cient at collecting tax than the central gov-
ernment (Hamilton, 1986;8 Aragon, 2009). Like Hamilton (1986), we do not consider in our
analysis other distortionary e¤ects of taxation than induced administrative or compliance
costs. Without loss of generality, we normalize to zero the tax collection cost incurred by
the central government. We denote by g (TL) the local taxation burden which is tax payment
and its induced collection costs. We have: g (0) = 0, g0 (TL) > 1, and g00 (TL) > 0. A partial
equilibrium interpretation of our model is that central transfers are costless for recipient local
governments.
The assumption of higher local collection costs for lower level governments appears par-
ticularly relevant in developing countries. First, a large part of central government revenue
comes from customs in these countries (see Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010, and Keen and Man-
6 We will use the term "unconditional grants" to qualify a non-matching transfer which does not depend
on the tax behavior of local governments. The unconditionality is then twofold: it concerns not only the
spending behavior of local governments but also their tax behavior.
7 We strictly follow the notation of Hamilton (1986).
8 With a similar assumption Hamilton (1986) explains the ypaper e¤ect. Reviewing the academic debate
over the ypaper e¤ect, Dahlby (2011) renewed interest in Hamiltons model, which "has not received the
attention that it deserves."
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sour, 2010, for a closer look at sub-Saharan Africa). Tax, duties, and tari¤s paid at the
borders are relatively easier to collect than local taxes. Second, one of the main successful
innovations in tax administration in recent years has been the creation of large taxpayer
units, which exploit scale economies, concentrating countriese¤orts on central taxes: Value
Added Tax; Corporate Income Tax; and Personal Income Tax (Baer, 2002). Local taxes
have not received the same support and attention in their design as central ones. For Bird
(2011), property tax remains the missing revenue in these countries.
Taxpayersbehaviour can also explain the relative lower compliance and higher admin-
istrative costs of local taxation. Indeed, the function g (:) may be considered as the reduced
form of a microeconomic model, where the taxpayer and local government interact in a
game à la Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986).9 In particular, the limited capacity of local
governments in tax enforcement (tax-base assessments and audits) induces some strategic
behaviour among taxpayers, who systematically under-declare their income or wealth be-
cause they expect similar underreporting by their neighbours. These social interactions are
stronger in smaller jurisdictions, as a result of the decentralization process. In other words, a
constrained budget for tax enforcement at the local level involves strategic complementarity
among taxpayers in their reporting decisions. This yields to a multiplicity of equilibria, in
particular local tax riots (zero tax revenue), as analyzed by Bassetto and Phelan (2008) and
Deneckere and Liang (2010).
We consider that the local government maximizes the representative residents utility
function U (X;Y ) subject to local government and individual budget constraints: Y = TL+tr
and y = X + g (TL). The strategic variable of local government is its own-source revenue.
We do not distinguish between the two tax instruments: tax rate or tax base. The optimal
local tax revenue, denoted by T L, is the solution of the following maximization programme:
T L  argmax
TL
U (y   g (TL) ; tr + TL) :
9 A formal development of this game is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The First Order Condition (FOC) is given by:
 g0 (TL)U1 (:) + U2 (:) = 0: (1)
The Second Order Condition (SOC) is assumed to be respected:
@2U (:)
@T 2L
=  g00 (TL)U1 (:) +
 
g0 (TL)
2
U11 (:)  2g0 (TL)U12 (:) + U22 (:) < 0:
Total di¤erentiation of (1) with respect to tr yields:
@TL
@tr
=   g
0 (TL)U12 (:) + U22 (:)
SOC
7 0:
We deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Unconditional central grants improve local own-source revenue if the mar-
ginal utility of public good increases with local tax revenue (@U2 (:) =@TL > 0).10
The variation of the marginal utility of the public good, with respect to local own-source
revenue, may be linked to individual preferences, scale economies in the provision of public
goods, and the ine¢ ciency of local administrations at tax collection. For instance, central
grants increase local public spending, which may improve voluntary tax compliance, and
consequently local own-source revenue (@TL=@tr > 0). In contrast to this virtuous circle,
a rise in transfers may also allow local governments to reduce their tax e¤ort, keeping un-
changed the level of local public goods (@TL=@tr < 0). Neither the SOC nor the normality of
the public good is a su¢ cient condition to obtain the intuitive negative relationship between
central grants and local own-source revenue.11 The sign of the cross derivative of the util-
10 Note that
@U2 (:) =@TL =  g0 (TL)U12 (:) + U22 (:) :
11 The normality of the public good is given by:
@ (tr + TL)
@y
=
@TL
@y
=   g
0 (TL)U11 (:) + U12 (:)
SOC
> 0:
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ity function (U12 (:)), which denes the complementarity or substitutability à la Edgeworth
between private and public consumption, is not restricted. Assuming the concavity of the
utility function with respect to public spending (U22 (:) < 0) would involve central grants in-
creasing local own-source revenue if the degree of substitutability between public and private
goods is su¢ cient. The literature on decentralization usually assumes independence between
public and private consumption (U12 (:) = 0). Combining these two preceding assumptions
(U22 (:) < 0 and U12 (:) = 0) induces the crowd out e¤ect often emphasized in the literature:
central grants reduce local own-source revenue. However, without any other restrictions than
the respect of the SOC and the normality of local public goods, Proposition 1 highlights a
theoretical ambiguous relationship between unconditional central grants and local own-source
revenue. The following section is devoted to going beyond this theoretical ambiguity through
an econometric analysis of the e¤ect of an unconditional central grant on local own-source
revenue in the Beninese case.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present a short history of Benin and its decentralization process, which
shares some common features with other African French-speaking countries (20 countries,
around 243 million inhabitants in 2009). We then develop our empirical analysis of the causal
impact of central grants on local own-source revenue, considering some non-linear e¤ects.
3.1 Benin overview
Benin belongs to the lower income group of countries, with an estimated per capita income
of US$740 in 2011. After a succession of military governments ended in 1972, with the last
coup led by Mathieu Kerekou, free elections ushered in the former Prime Minister, Nicephore
Soglo, as President in 1991. With the strong support of the north of the country (Alibori,
Atacora, Borgou, and Donga), Mathieu Kerekou regained power in 1996 and stepped down
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in March 2006. His successor, Thomas Yayi Boni, whose power base is in the south of the
country (Atlantic, Collines, and Mono) was reelected in 2011.
Decentralization in Benin is a top-down process, as in a lot of French-speaking African
countries.12 It began in 1998, through the transfer of several competencies to local Beni-
nese jurisdictions, called communes. These competencies now range from elementary schools
to economic development, and include transport infrastructure, environment, health, social
goods, tourism, security, and marketplace management. While an elected local government
manages the communes, a representative of the central government is in charge of départe-
ments. Local elections occurred in 2002 and 2007.
As in many African French-speaking countries, the territorial shape of Beninese com-
munes results from history and not from any economic consideration with respect to e¢ -
ciency in public good provision.13 With a total population of 8.93 million inhabitants in
2009, Benin has 77 communes spread through 12 départements. Population and geographi-
cal size di¤er signicantly among the communes: Tanguieta stretches out across more than
5,460 square kilometres, with a population of 62,321 inhabitants in 2008 (11.4 inhabitants
per square kilometre), while Akro-Missérété contains 98,961 inhabitants in only 79 square
kilometre (1,252 inhabitants per square kilometre).
Table 1 presents the 77 Beninese communesrevenue, distinguishing between local own-
source revenue (tax and non-tax) and central grants (conditional and unconditional) over
the period 20032008. A local representative of the central tax administration (Directions
Départementales des Impôts) collects local taxes, mainly property and patent taxes.14 By
contrast, local governments support the collection costs of non-tax own-source revenue, re-
lated essentially to some administrative services and to public domain occupations: market
12 A noteworthy exception is the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose new constitution, approved in 2006,
is a compromise between Federalists and Centralists.
13 For instance, Burkina Faso has 351 communes for 16.2 million inhabitants, while Mali has 703 communes
for 15 million inhabitants.
14 Note that local governments have been able to levy a specic tax called taxe sur le developpement
municipalon any economic activity in their territory (agriculture, breeding, mining, tourism...) since 2011,
the rates being determined by the central government (see Chambas, 2010, for a detailed analysis of local
scal resources in sub-Saharan Africa).
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stalls, parking charges, kiosks, hoardings etc. Over the period 2003-2008 the main condi-
tional central grant was dedicated to the local civil servant payroll. There were also four
unconditional transfers: (1) A perequation transfer; (2) A balancing grant concerning very
poor communes;15 (3) A grant substituting revenue raising from a suppressed per capita
lump sum tax (taxe civique) inherited from the colonial past; (4) A grant based on a road
tax which is collected by customs on exports (0.85 percent of the value of exported goods).
The latter will be decisive in our empirical analysis.
Table 1 : Average composition of the 77 Beninese communesrevenue - 2003-2008
(million FCFA)
Average level
Percentage of
total local revenue
Local tax own-source revenue 7,709 46
Local non-tax own-source revenue 3,949 24
Conditional central grants 350 2
Unconditional central grants 4,791 28
Road tax 2,805 17
Total local revenue 16,799 100
Source: Beninese Ministry of Finance and Economy and Beninese Tresury.
We focus on the e¤ect of the main unconditional transfer, namely the road tax, on local
own-source revenue for two reasons. First, we do not have the detailed allocation among
communes for the other grants. Second, the annual total amount of the road tax depends on
exports and is shared among communes following a rule which remained unchanged over the
period studied: 80 percent is allocated to three special communes (Cotonou, 60 percent;
Porto-Novo, 24 percent; and Parakou, 16 percent), while the rest is distributed among the
15 Any commune should have a total revenue at least equal to 40 million FCFA. This grant completes other
revenues if needed.
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74 other communes, according to their respective demographic weight. Given these charac-
teristics, the road tax displays two interesting properties for our empirical analysis: (1) its
amount varies over time, allowing the use of panel methods; (2) its allocation rule is xed,
ensuring the discovery of a possible causal relationship. Indeed, scal capacity and/or scal
e¤ort are not at play in determining the allocation of this unconditional transfer so that it
makes sure the relation observed between the local resources and the central grant reects a
causal impact of the grant on the local resources and not the opposite.
3.2 Econometric framework
We study the e¤ect of road tax on local own-source revenue. We then rene our empirical
work by distinguishing communes by their wealth and their partisan a¢ liation. Our dataset
covers the 74 relevant communes over the period 20032008.16 We exclude the three "special"
communes from our sample (Cotonou, Porto-Novo, and Parakou), which have a special status
in the Beninese intergovernmental grants system and di¤er notably from the other 74.
The rst relationship we study is given by
TLit = trit + 'Xit + TLit 1 + i + t + "it; (2)
where TLit is the per capita own-source revenue of jurisdiction i at date t, trit is the uncondi-
tional central transfer received by local government i at t, and Xit is a set of specic controls.
Among these we consider the employment rate in département d (Ndt) to control for local
economic conditions, which can at the same time determine the total amount of transfers
distributed and the level of local own-source revenue. We also control for the jurisdictions
population density (Dit) to capture any potential scale economies in tax collecting and in
the provision of public goods. This control variable is crucial since the amount of the trans-
fer depends on the relative population size of jurisdictions and population may also impact
16 Data for commune revenues come from the Beninese Ministry of Finances and Economy. The other
control variables are drawn from WDI (World Development Indicators), Afrobarometers, and Demographic
and Health Surveys, provided by the National Institute of Statistic and Economic Analysis of Benin.
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local own-source revenue, in particular through the existence of scale economies in tax col-
lection or in local public goods provision. To avoid this potential bias, we consider per capita
own-source revenue to account for the e¤ect of the population size and we introduce the
jurisdictions population density as a control variable to capture potential scale economies.
Another solution would have been to consider the per capita transfer, which would be iden-
tical among jurisdictions. However, in this case, we could not introduce time dummies.
Hence, we keep unconditional grants in absolute terms to preserve the spatial variability of
the independent variable (trit), which allows us to include time dummies. Lastly, we consider
spillovers among local governments (Ajt), due to tax-base mobility or some yardstick compe-
tition. Grant programmes encouraging a jurisdiction to raise its own-source revenue might,
thereby, induce the others to increase their revenue too. As population levels - and thus
the amount of transfers received - are likely to be spatially correlated, this copycate¤ect
has to be considered. Ajt is dened as the weighted average vector of per capita own-source
revenue among neighbours j at time t; more formally, we consider Ajt =
X
wcTLjt, where
wc is a contiguity matrix, taking value 1 if two jurisdictions share a common border, and
zero otherwise.
We also introduce a lagged dependent variable, TLit 1 to capture the persistency in local
revenues (Veiga and Veiga, 2007). Variable i represents commune-xed e¤ects, t are time
dummies, and "it is the error term. Time dummies control for omitted variables that change
over time but not across jurisdictions, in particular for the level of exports, which determines
the total level of central transfers allocated to jurisdictions and may also a¤ect per capita
own-source revenue.17 Tables 2 and 3 provide detailed summary statistics and correlations
of the key variables in our analysis for the 74 communes over the period 20032008.
An important issue, emphasized by Knight (2002), Gordon (2004), and Dahlberg, Mörk,
Rattso, and Agren (2008), is the risk of endogeneity of central grants. Indeed, an uncon-
ditional transfer may actually become an implicit matching transfer if central government
17 Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. Note that we use a logarithmic
form of the specication. Data is in CFA francs converted to constant value to account for ination.
11
awards local governments that commit their own-source revenue to some public spending.
Under such a process of negotiation, local own-source revenue determines central grants,
which is the opposite relationship to what we want to analyze. In our case, we are able to
check that the allocation of the remaining 20 percent of the road tax grant (80 percent is
allocated to the three special communes) corresponds to its theoretical value, denoted by
Ttrit, which is:
Ttrit =
0:2 Popit trit
Popit   PopSpet ;
where trit is the sum of transfers received by jurisdictions i in year t, Popit is the popula-
tion of a jurisdiction i, Popit is the total population in Benin at t, and PopSpet is the
population of the three specialcommunes. The coe¢ cient of correlation between the road
tax grant actually received and its theoretical value is equal to 0.998, signicant at 1 percent
level, indicating the absence of any discretion in the allocation process.
A second econometric issue results from the introduction of the lagged dependent variable
(TLit 1), which reveals the inconsistency of xed-e¤ect estimators (Nickell, 1981). We then
follow Blundell and Bond (1998), and use the GMM-System estimator, allowing us to control
for unobserved country-specic e¤ects and the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables.
Finally, we rene our empirical analysis by considering some economic and political het-
erogeneity among jurisdictions. We rst distinguish communes by their wealth to capture
di¤erences in local tax bases, and/or local governmentsability to increase own-source rev-
enue. Equation (2) becomes:
TLit = 1(trit  Pi) + 2(trit NPi) + 'Xit + TLit 1 + i + t + "it; (3)
where Pi is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the local government i is poor, and zero
otherwise, and NPi = 1   Pi. We consider poor those communes belonging to the rst
quartile of local own-source revenue in 2003. Secondly, we look at communes partisan
a¢ liation, which may also a¤ect local governmentsscal behaviour. We thus introduce a
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dummy variable, denoted by Fit, to distinguish jurisdictions belonging to the presidents
electoral heartland, also called ef communes, from the others. More formally, the variable
Fit takes the value 1 if the local government in commune i has the same partisan a¢ liation
as the president in o¢ ce, and zero otherwise, and NFit = 1  Fit. We obtain:
TLit = 3(trit  Fit) + 4(trit NFit) + 'Xit + TLit 1 + i + t + "it: (4)
3.3 Results
Table 4 presents estimation results for the static version ( = 0) of equations (2), (3), and
(4) with a xed-e¤ect estimator. To check the robustness of our results we introduce control
variables progressively.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 show a positive e¤ect of central unconditional transfers
on per capita local own-source revenue ( varying between 0.34 and 0.41, signicant at
1 percent level). Estimations of equation (3) (columns 3 and 4) emphasize a higher and
more signicant e¤ect on non-poor communes.18 Moreover, this e¤ect does not exist for
the poorest communes: the coe¢ cient 1 becomes insignicant if we consider very poor
communes belonging to the rst decile (columns 5 and 6).19 Local governments without
political a¢ liation to the president raise signicantly more own-source revenue in response to
higher central grants than ef communes (columns 7 and 8). Fisher tests allow us to conclude
that coe¢ cients 3 and 4 are signicantly di¤erent. The coe¢ cient of the weighted average
vector of per capita local own-source revenue (Ajt) is signicantly positive at 1 percent level,
18 However, Fisher tests in these rst estimations do not allow us to conclude that coe¢ cients 1 and 2
are signicantly di¤erent.
19 A structural break between poor and non-poor communes may produce more appropriate results by
separating regressions, rather than combining them into a unique one. A Chow test indicates that independent
variables do not have di¤erent impacts on the di¤erent subgroups of the population. We cannot reject the
null hypothesis of coe¢ cients stability when we dene poor communes either as communes belonging to the
rst quartile (column 1), or to the rst decile (column 2).
Test of the presence of structural break b etween poor and non-p oor
(1) (2)
Chow test: p -value 0.898 0.976
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as expected. This result is consistent with the relevant literature, which highlights strategic
complementarity among local tax policies (Brueckner, 1998; Caldeira, Foucault, and Rota-
Graziosi, 2008 for the Beninese case). Population density is positively correlated with per
capita local own-source revenue, indicating scale economies in tax collecting. In contrast,
economic conditions captured by the departmental employment rate have no e¤ect on this
revenue.
Table 5 presents estimation results for the dynamic version of our empirical models
( 6= 0) with a one-step robust GMM-System. We assume the potential endogeneity of the
weighted average vector of local own-source revenue, the employment rates and the popu-
lation density and strict exogeneity of our independent variable and time dummies. The
lagged levels of the variables are used as instruments in regressions in level, as well as in
regressions in di¤erence. Following Roodman (2009), we collapse the instruments and limit
their number to avoid a non-optimal weight matrix, biased standard errors, and incorrect
over-identication tests.20 Column (1) in Table 5 attests to a positive e¤ect of unconditional
grants on local own-source revenue,  remaining signicantly positive. The estimation results
in Table 5 also highlight the heterogeneous impact of decentralization: this e¤ect is smaller
for poor communes (columns 2 and 3), and is stronger for local governments not belonging
to the presidents electoral heartland (column 4). Fisher tests tend to conrm signicant
di¤erences among these coe¢ cients.
Tackling the endogeneity issue of central grants, our analysis concludes that there is a
positive e¤ect of unconditional transfers on local own-source revenue. This result di¤ers from
Shah (1990), Rajaraman and Vasishtha (2000), and Panda (2009), who obtain an opposite
relationship by studying Brazilian municipalities and Indian states, respectively. However,
these authors do not consider any potential endogeneity bias. Addressing the issue of the
endogeneity of grants, Mogues, Benin, and Cudjoe (2009) also show that transfers (from
the central government and donor funds) discourage local own-source revenue in Ghana. A
20 With the Hansen test we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the overall validity of the instruments
orthogonality conditions.
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possible explanation for the di¤erence between Mogues, Benin, and Cudjoe (2009) and our
results is the lower scal autonomy of Ghanas districts with respect to Beninese communes.
The main resources of the former are conditional grants, which restrict Ghanaian local gov-
ernments in their expenditure choices. Being less accountable in spending, districts have less
incentive to raise revenue. Another complementary explanation is provided by Banful (2011)
who established that central grants remain politically motivated despite a formula-based re-
source allocation mechanism. This is not the case in Benin, where the allocation of the main
unconditional transfer (the road tax) respects the population of the jurisdictions rule.
Turning to works on developed countries, our conclusion is close to Skidmore (1999),
Smart (2007), Buettner (2006), and Dahlberg, Mörk, Rattso, and Agren (2008). The rst two
authors identify a positive e¤ect of central grants on locally generated revenues in the USA
and Canada, respectively. Buettner (2006) and Dahlberg, Mörk, Rattso, and Agren (2008)
come to a similar conclusion for Germany and Sweden. Both studies use a discontinuity in the
grant allocation rule to deal with the endogeneity issue of grants. However, these works only
focus on equalization or total transfers. Our analysis complements these by highlighting the
incentive e¤ect of unconditional grants on local own-source revenue in a developing country.
4 Conclusion
By adopting a simple model of optimal taxation, we have highlighted a theoretical ambiguity
over the e¤ect of unconditional central grants on local own-source revenue. Our empirical
analysis focuses on Benin. We study the e¤ect of unconditional grants that have the properties
of being collected centrally and allocated among local governments through a xed and simple
rule (population of jurisdictions). Our results highlight a positive impact of this transfer on
local own-source revenue. This e¤ect is contingent on a minimum level of local government
wealth. Moreover, jurisdictions that do not share the same political a¢ liation as the president
in o¢ ce are more prone to mobilize revenue than other communes.
Unconditional central grants alleviate the revenue constraints of local governments both
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directly and indirectly. The transfer that we study here, namely the road tax, is far from
being perfect. Collected at the border, it is equivalent to a tax on exports, which may be
detrimental for the Beninese economy. Moreover, despite its incentive e¤ect on own-source
revenue, it does not address the equity issue. A natural extension of our analysis would be
to consider local public spending, in order to assess the overall and redistributional impact
of this transfer.
However, our result contributes to the debate on designing an appropriate intergovern-
mental transfer system in developing countries. Allocating central grants on a performance
basis is often presented as the only way to provide adequate incentives to local governments
in terms of scal discipline. An implicit assumption of such a statement is that simple un-
conditional transfers reduce recipient governmentstax collection e¤orts. We emphasize that
this hypothesis is not only untrue in Benin, but also that this kind of grants actually has an
incentive e¤ect on local own-source revenue. Further studies are clearly necessary to estab-
lish if Benin is only a counter-example, or if our result holds more generally for developing
countries. However, we must highlight that simple unconditional grants should be more
closely considered to solve the vertical imbalance in developing countries. In addition to
their potential incentive e¤ect on local own-source revenue, they are, in practice, easier to
ascertain and less vulnerable to discretion and manipulation in their allocation than other
more complex formula-based transfers.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the key variables (74 communes, 20032008)
Mean Std dev. Min Max
per capita own-source revenue (TLit) 712.60 826.84 6.72 6931.68
Road tax (trit) 10,200,000 5,245,727 124,200 50,900,000
Employment rate (Ndt) 26.52 10.61 3.45 56.54
Population density (Dit) 161.10 197.75 7.61 965.95
Partisan a¢ liation, Fit 0.60 0.48 0 1
First quartile of poor, Pi 0.25 0.43 0 1
First decile of poor, P 0i 0.10 0.31 0 1
Table 3: Correlation of the key variables (74 communes, 20032008)
TLit trit Ndt Dit Fit Pi P
0
i
per capita own-source revenue (TLit) 1
Road tax (trit) 0.995* 1
Employment rate (Ndt) -0.050 -0.103* 1
Population density (Dit) 0.405* 0.116* -0.028 1
Partisan a¢ liation (Fit) 0.249* 0.019 0.172* 0.477* 1
First quartile of poor (Pi) -0.338* -0.083 -0.004 -0.177* -0.204* 1
First decile of poor (P 0i ) -0.204* -0.089 0.149* -0.146* -0.032 0.592* 1
*: co e¢ cient sign icant at 10 % level
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